The difference between libel and slander is that libel is printed or published and slander is spoken. Both are subsets of defamation. (I know, you can imagine how much fun it is to sue for defamation for stuff on radio or TV. Is it spoken -- and thus slander -- or written -- and thus libel? I can't remember right now.)
Defamation means just what it says: a statement that de-fames the subject of the statement, or, more exactly, that injures the reputation of the person about whom the statement is made.
Then there's another difference: public defamation, which is a crime at common law, versus private defamation, which is a cause of action brought by the plaintiff who has been defamed against the defendant who has defamed him or her. The First Amendment disposed of public defamation once and for all. Before that, you could be prosecuted for defaming somebody and, if found guilty, go to jail for it. Truth was not a defense.
In the era of the framing and adoption of the First Amendment, most lawyers and jurists read it narrowly, and most printers read it widely. Narrowly means "no prior restraint" but no protection for legal action based on statements already made and published. Widely means no public defamation prosecutions, and at least some limits on suing for private defamation.
In the early nineteenth century, the rule changed -- truth if published for good motives (generously defined) was not libel or slander of any sort. Thus, all that was left was the private legal causes of action for libel and slander. If Y said or wrote or published something about X that (i) was not true and (ii) that injured X's reputation, X could sue for libel or slander. X had to show that the statement was false and that it did indeed damage his reputation and that it was "published" -- that is, that it was not just said by Y to X but that at least one other person heard it. To defend, Y had to show that he had a good-faith reason for publishing the statement (for example, he had good reason to believe it was true); Y could also show that the statement would not injure X's reputation. (To use a silly example, Y calls X an "isosceles triangle.")
Some statements were libel or slander per se; until well into the twentieth century, it was libel or slander per se to accuse a woman of being promiscuous, or to accuse a man or a woman of being homosexual, or to accuse a lawyer of having been disbarred, etc., etc.
In 1964, in NEW YORK TIMES CO. v. SULLIVAN, the Supreme Court decided a major case that transformed the face of libel and slander law by bringing it within the confines of the First Amendment's protection of freedom of speech and press.
Sullivan, as I recall, was an Alabama police official who took offense at a full-page advertisement published by civil-rights organizations in THE NEW YORK TIMES that, he said, libeled him.
The Court held as follows:
1. The First Amendment changed the face of libel and slander law. It was designed to protect the rights of individuals and groups to engage in wide-open, robust, uninhibited discussion of public issues.
2. If a person sues for libel or slander and he or she is a public official, then the First Amendment imposes severe restrictions on his or her lawsuit. The plaintiff must show not only that the statement complained of is false, but that it was published with "actual malice" -- that is, actual knowledge of its truth or falsity or reckless disregard for whether it was true or false. (For example, if the editor said, "I don't care -- it sounds good -- let's run it," that's reckless disregard. You have to check, but even a minimal effort at checking may well be enough to overcome the reckless disregard standard.)
The next question was, "What about people who are not public figures but who are extensively involved in public discussion and/or controversy?" In a series of Supreme Court cases, the Justices evolved a set of standards for determining when and whether a "public figure" has to meet the same standards required for a public official to maintain a successful libel/slander/defamation suit. In sum, the person must have injected himself deliberately into the sphere of public controversy and the statements complained of must be directly linked to that deliberate injection into the sphere of public controversy.
Thus, as you can imagine, it ends up being a case-by-case inquiry for those who are not public officials.
At bottom, therefore, the question you raised -- is all this thought-crime? -- is really beside the point, because thought-crime has to do with government prosecution of a person solely for what he or she is *thinking.* And there's no such thought-crime in the area of libel and slander.
As for thought-crime more generally, note further that the original definition of thought-crime (in George Orwell's _1984_, I'm pretty sure) is simply about thought. In the case of libel/slander/defamation, the act of publication is a necessary part of the cause of action.
Suppose I write, "John Smith is a lying, thieving bum!" and lock the paper in my desk and don't show it to anybody. Suppose, further, that Johmn Smith breaks into my desk drawer and steals the paper and then sues me for libel for it. No good, on two counts: (i) I never published it (in the sense of never showing it to any third party at all). (ii) John Smith published the libel against himself, and thus he cannot sue me for it.
As for hate crimes and thought-crime, again, mere expressions of hate (e.g., someone calling me anti-Semitic things) are not prosecutable and should not be prosecutable.
BUT if John Smith screams, "You Christ-killer! I'll kill you!" and beats me senseless, then what he has done is not mere assault and battery but a hate-crime. He has proclaimed his purpose in assaulting and battering me to be that of furthering his bigotry. He intends the assault and battery to be an expression of bigotry and an incitement to others to do as he does. Therefore, he can and should be prosecuted for assault-and-battery with the added penalties appropriate for a hate-crime.
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